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How perceptions matter: urban mobility and settlement in Maputo and Matola (Mozambique) since independence.

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Conceived and perceived as white areas during the colonial era, the urban areas of Maputo and Matola (now part of the great Maputo plan) were subsequently denied to non “producers” and war refugees (during the civil war, from the end of 1970s to 1992), before opening up to “market forces” with the liberalization of the Mozambican economy in the more recent period, resulting in an increasing occupation by the emerging middle class. This paper contends that the exclusive forms of governance which have shaped the urban space of Maputo and Matola since colonial times have retained prevalent characteristics in the present period in spite of local, national and international changes in Mozambican politics. Drawing from original research conducted in Mozambique in 2009 & 2010, the paper explores different policies related to mobility within and settlement into the city in order to trace changes and continuities in perceptions of urban citizenship. In particular, the paper looks at the pass law and the indigenous system during the colonial period, the infamous „Operation Production“ in 1983 and the *guia de marcha*¹ (1979) before turning to post-socialist urban policies (the land law reform and the redrafting of Maputo and Matola’s master plans). The paper represents an attempt at unpacking Mozambican political leaders’ perceptions and representations of urban citizenship and their impact on policy-making.

1. Pass law, indigenous system and mobility in Portuguese colonial cities in Mozambique

Controlling the mobility of the population and its settlement in the cities and particularly in the capital (Lourenço Marques-LM) had been part of the economic, social and political system of the Portuguese colonial administration. The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th were marked by the relevant events that contributed to the identification of the administrative tools, aiming to control this mobility and the settlement of the *indigenous*. Diamond in Kimberley (1867) and gold in Witwatersrand (1886) had been discovered, revitalizing the regional economy and particularly increasing the geostrategic position of LM, with its harbor, railway and roads, for the importation and exportation of the merchandise related to the mining industry. Thus, following these events, LM became a city in 1887, the capital of Mozambique in 1898 and there was a need to build infrastructures that

1 Mozambicans who wanted to move from one residential area to another, within or outside the city, should had to hold the *guia de marcha*, without which one could not be allowed to move.

required the availability of the cheaper labor force whenever needed, to lower the costs and maximize the benefits, according to the logic of the Portuguese colonial system. The establishment of the *Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas* (indigenous affairs services), which aimed, among other things, to manage the circulation of the African population and assure the supply of the labor force for the *shibalo*², was part of that.

Article 1 of the 1891 Pass Law, associated with the indigenous affairs services, also accomplish the same function. According to this article, no indigenous person could establish himself /herself in the city, without being employed in a job recognized by the colonial authority.³ This law aimed on the one hand to force the African population to seek employment, whatever the conditions were, and on the other, to avoid the establishment of the unemployed *indigenous* in the city. In a similar way to what happened in the Transvaal and Kimberley from 1870/80, in Johannesburg under the Apartheid system (with the Native Urban Act in 1923 and then 1934), the unemployed *indigenous* in LM were perceived as a problem that had to be overcome and their presence discouraged. It was seen as a result of the laziness of the unemployed themselves and not as a result of the failure of the labor market⁴. The unemployed were considered to have chosen to be so, or those who did not want to work. Hence the implementation of the forced labor system, such as *shibalo*. The *Estatuto dos Indígenas da Provincia de Moçambique from 1954* define as a criminal offense, that men aged 18 or older stay in the city without working, or that does in a non official manner.

The urban space was perceived as a white area. Colored people, Asians and the Africans who had become *assimilados*⁵ were tolerated. The restrictions were so rigid that the *indigenous* referred to LM as “*xilunguine*⁶”, which in *xironga* (one of the African languages spoken by those from Southern Mozambique and particularly from LM) means “there where white people live”. Data from 1960 and 1961 testifies to this. At this time Mozambique had 6 592 994 habitants. 2, 5% of them were White, Asians and Colored all together, and they lived in the urban areas⁷. To strengthen control over African mobility in the cities and restrict their

2 Forced labor for the Africans that were not considered assimilated.

3 *Boletim Oficial*, de 15.7.1891

4 Penvenne, 1993

5 Those who according to the Código de Assistencia ao Nativo de 1921, had assimilated the Portuguese culture, such as being able to speak portuguese

6 Penvenne, 1995

7 Mondlane, 1975 : 43, Christie, 1996 :20

access, the government decided to intensify the registration system in 1949. According to the new rules, all the Africans who arrived in the city had to register with the municipality within 3 days. Once in the city Africans had two weeks to find a job or had to return. Authorization was also necessary to leave the city. Failing to fulfill these regulations gave the authorities the right to drive these Africans to the *shibalo*.

The combination of the African Labor Code, racial discrimination, the indigenous system and the *shibalo*, enabled the colonial government to allow for the control and exploitation of the African labor force, to reserve a privileged position for white Portuguese labor, and to exclude the majority of the African population.

A process that had already begun after the mineral boom in South Africa, the control of the labor force and the restriction of their access to the urban spaces, were reinforced after LM had gained its geopolitical relevance. Thus, the centralization of the Railway and Port System in 1907 was followed by the reinforcement and the hierarchical system to access job, based on race. The color of the skin and the origin together became the relevant aspects to access job and for the social mobility⁸. By the end of the 1920s and beginning of 1930s, during the world economic crisis, the government introduced the clause 70%, to protect white labor force. According to this clause, the entrepreneurs had to employ at least 70% of white people⁹¹⁰. As a result, according to Penvenne¹¹, the number of white workers in the harbor and in the railway trip¹¹ led from 1910 to 1925. As shown by Cahen¹², the 1926 Indigenous Labor Code sought to establish the professional careers according to their capacity to supply the livelihood for their holders. According to this code, only the professions integrated in the labor market, where white people represented the majority, were considered by the colonial administration. Those who didn't hold these professions (most of them Africans), were considered unemployed and susceptible to *shibalo*, or to be evicted from the urban space.

After the World War II and until the end of the 1950s, or before the abolition of the indigenous system (1960/1)¹², the situation got worse. The discriminated treatment given to

8 Penvenne, 1995

9 Cahen, 2008 :101

10 :82

11 :100

12 Cahen, 2008 :102

the Africans in the cities, ended up by discouraging their establishment here. From 1917, the Africans had to ask for an *Alvara*¹³ to become assimilated and in order to access certain civil rights. In 1926 when was introduced the Labor Force Code, the central issue to become an assimilated was not only being able to speak Portuguese, but also hold a profession “integrated” in the market. In 1948 one more requirement was added to acquire a “market integrated profession¹⁴”. A part from all the other requirements, in addition the Africans had to hold 4 years of primary studies, whereas the white people, automatically assimilated, some time illiterate, had no need. In 1954, the new indigenous code was introduced¹⁵. According to this, more than being able to speak portuguese, hold a “market integrated profession” and hold 4 years of primary studies, the *indigenous* had to speak fluently the Portuguese, which was not the reality for most of them.

From the end of 1950s and beginning of 1960s, with the abolition with the indigenous system, the international pressure (the independence of the French and British colonies), the restrictions became supple. Number of *indigenous* in urban Maputo and Matola increased. **2.**

Urban boom in post-colonial Mozambique: reasons and consequences

The independence of the country (June, 25th 1975) meant the “Africanization” and “Mozambicanization” of the cities and the continuous growth of the urban population in general and in particular in Maputo¹⁶ and Matola. While they used to be white areas denied to the majority of the *indigenous*, these places became accessible. Apart from its promotion by the post-colonial government, just after independence, the urban population growth was caused by other factors. By the end of the 1970s the country went through an armed conflict that was blamed to having displaced rural population to the cities. According to a press report by Elias¹⁷¹⁸, the government faced the problem to settle about 5635 families, coming from Gaza and Inhambane provinces, as war refugees. Regarding the impact of the armed conflict on the on the urban population’s growth, it’s possible to argue differently, although the position sustained by Pitcher¹⁹, that the war displaced about 3.7 million of Mozambicans to

13 Permit

14 Cahen, 2008 :100

15 Cahen, 2008 :103 ,104

16 After the independence, in 1976, the name of Lourenço Marques became Maputo

17 Tempo, 1988:19

18 : 104

the cities. Without necessarily denying its role, authors concur to say that the war was not the only factor pushing people into cities. The perception of better life conditions and security in the cities played an important role.

Rural development programs implemented by the Frelimo government which peasants resented was a third factor. From the independence onwards, the government decided to invest more on state farms, neglecting the small farms held by peasants and that represented the basic livelihood for the majority of the rural population. Instead, the government forced a collective production in communal villages, a process which was resisted by peasants. The failure of the peasant production contributed to the rural exodus. At about the same time the Apartheid government decided to reduce the number of migrant labor force by the end of 1970s, as a result of the oil crisis¹⁹. Mozambicans working in South Africa were forced to return. Instead of going back to their places of origin (most of them were from rural Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane), these returnees settled down in Maputo and Matola. Being the capital city and close to South Africa, Maputo was perceived as having the better job opportunities. Thus, in 1980, this city hosted 48% of the total urban population²⁰²¹. These aspects, together with the floods and the drought in the 1980s, contributed to rapid and uncontrolled urban growth, continuing a process which had started after World War II. As indicated by Penvenne²², Maputo city, went from 68.000 habitants in 1940 to 184.000 in 1960. The African labor force in the private sector rose from 47.400 in 1950 to 96.000 in 1962. By the end of the 1940s the number of white colons also increased, due to the whitening policy of the colonial government. In 1970 the census reported 378 348 habitants for Maputo and 101.754 for Matola. At independence, Maputo hosted 505 000 habitants²². The first census after independence (1980) continued to show the increase in the urban population with 739 077 inhabitants for Maputo and 755.300 for Matola.²³²⁴ A year and a half after the first census the number of habitants in Maputo increased by more than 100. 000, moving from 739 007 to 850 000 habitants²⁵. According to La Suisse²⁶ the number of new arrivals in Maputo achieved 20

19 Olson, 1990

20 Lima, S.D :19

21

22 Rodrigues, Noticias, 04 juin 1983

23 Le Lourenço Marques colonial est devenu la ville de Maputo après l'indépendance ²⁵ Rodrigues, Noticias, 04 juin 1983

24 mai 1983

per day in 1982. The political discourse presented this rapid and immeasurable growth as a problem that required a political intervention.

2.1. The governance of mobility in socialist cities: changes or continuities?

From independence onwards, as under colonization, there was always a political collective consciousness for the need to control the mobility of the population, even if during the first years after independence, the government incited the settlement of Africans in the cities. As indicated by Serra²⁵, the idea of controlling who goes where, to do what, in which conditions and for which reasons, in the urban areas can be traced back to the 1970s. For Honguana²⁶, during the liberation war, there was already the idea to control mobility, in the liberated zones, by using the *guia de marcha*. With the intensification of the rural exodus, by the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, the efforts for this control and the restrictions to access the cities became rigid. For example, as in the rural areas with the establishment of communal villages, the government, in its General Plan for the Cities from 1979/80, decided to establish the communal neighborhood in the cities in December 1979. Here the number of habitants had to be restricted to a maximum of 12 500 people, representing 2500 families. The Ministry of interior (home affairs) in collaboration with the city council, the deputies of the city assembly, the revitalizing groups²⁷ and the group of popular vigilance, were in charge of controlling the circulation of people entering and leaving cities.²⁸

It was during this period (1970/80s) that city assemblies were established, the city councils, the chief of 10 houses, the secretary and the chief of the neighbourhood, which together made up the residents' committee. To strengthen the control over circulation, in 1982 the resident card²⁹ was introduced and in February 1983 the Ministry of interior published a circular with new rules for movement. According to this circular, all the residents (national or foreigner), moving out of their usual residential area, had to hold a *guia de marcha*. Once arrived at destination, they had to present themselves, within 48 hours, to the local authorities, accompanied by the hosting family. The latter in turn had to present their resident card and

25 From an informal conversation held on 27th July 2009

26 Interviewed on 05 January 2010

27 These were the local based authorities, created by the Frelimo's government, aiming to spread and assure the accomplishment of the political ideology in local level.

28 Frelimo (c), 1979

29 Noticias, 23rd July 1982, Mavanga, 14th August 1982

identity document. When changing residential area, there was a need to announce it 48 hours before to the authorities of the new residential area and once there, introduce yourself within the same period of time. Not holding the *guia de marcha*, could result the change in residence being refused. Politically this measure aimed to mobilize the citizens to establish a new social relationship, based on collective and voluntary work in the cities³².

Nevertheless, those restrictive measures actually mobilized deeper perceptions and representations of the governance of urban mobility and settlement within the Frelimo government and among leaders. This will be analysed through the study of the infamous Operation Production. The process of the implementation of this measure, and its coercitive character allows establishing certain parallelism with the colonial form of urban governance. It can help to see continuities and discontinuities on the governance of the mobility in Maputo and Matola city, considering the colonial heritage.

2.2. “Operation production” (1983): the politicization of the urban “unproductive”

Studies done by Muller³³, Meny and Thoenig³⁴, argue that there is no political problem by default. It is a social phenomenon, which through a process, of political representation, is perceived as demanding a political intervention. This perspective, of a social production of the politics³⁵, allows understanding the Operation Production and its legitimating rhetoric. The discourse of Frelimo justified the implementation of the OP, as a political-organizational task, aiming to make productive the unproductive that lived in the cities, that consumed and did not produce, and for that reason, potential criminals, prostitutes (in the case of women), parasites and wandering. In this sense, unemployed people, the single mothers, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the witch doctors were represented in the political scene as a danger for the socialist model of governance of the urban space. In fact, the strong social control which the socialist system already imposed upon the population, with the people’s militia and regular

³² Frelimo (c), 1979

³³ 2000

³⁴ 1989

³⁵ Lagroye, 2006

raids in town, what was left of prostitution and crime (the main problems that OP was supposed to overcome) were objectively not such that they could justify the implementation of such a measure, and even less of the way in which it was implemented. Data show that from 1982 to 1983, before the implementation of the OP, it decreased, by moving from 32.473 in 1982 to 22.776³⁰³¹.

As argued by Thoenig³⁷, a phenomenon has to be interpreted according to the political rhetoric in order to lead to a political intervention. The political agenda is characterized by its cognitive nature, which are the mechanisms through which the political leaders perceive the phenomenon and build their policies. The choice of the policy is affected by the structure of the decision making system and by the cognitive scope of the decision-maker that is limited, by default³².

“The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the decider himself... there will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process...”³³

Bourdieu³⁴ also argues that there is a social aspect in the schema of perceptions, of the actions and of the thoughts, which constitutes the social structure or the political scope, in all sorts of political intervention. The rural exodus and the presence of unemployed people in Mozambican cities in general and in particular in Maputo and Matola, is not a recent phenomenon. According to Araujo³⁵, it existed before, and continued to exist after the OP. In a given moment, it was perceived as a constraint for the interventionist capacity and for the monopoly of the coercion, to refer to Weber, of the socialist state, which was supposed to be omnipresent. This set of perceptions and representations led to the OP. It's possible to argue that there is a certain parallelism on the perceptions and representations of the political leaders, of the urban mobility and governance during different political, social and economic context. As during the colonial time (where the urban area was perceived as white area),

30 Serra, 1990

31

32 Muller, 2003 :41, Shepard, 2004, Thoenig, 2004

33 Citation from John Fitzgerald Kennedy, in Allison and Graham, 1999.

34 Braud, 2008

35 Interviewé le 20 mai 2010

where unemployed *indigenous* were denied and discouraged the right to the city, and forcefully driven to *shibalo*, after the independence, the implementation of the Operation Production, in spite of the political discourse of rupture with the colonial heritage, reproduced the same concept, regarding the unemployed people (politically perceived as potential criminals and prostitutes). In fact, as happened in colonial time, people evicted from the cities during the OP were not necessarily unemployed. They couldn't prove their status of producers (to avoid being evicted), as they did not have a professional card, required by the government. The colonial government also demanded the presentation of the professional card for the *indigenous* living in town. Also, most of the political leaders of the post-colonial Mozambican had lived in the colonial Maputo and Matola and experienced the colonial restrictions to access the urban areas. It does not mean that they wanted to reproduce the same experience. But the fact that they were under this colonial urban governance, might have had an impact on the way they intended to organize the urban areas and define their citizens.

3. Land law, displacement and the role of the municipality

The political transition, in the 1990s, and the liberal turning process in Mozambique were marked by the restructuring of different policies such as land policy, housing policy, the decentralization process and the drafting of a new master plan. According to official policy documents and discourses, the aim was to accommodate the new political, economic and socio-cultural reality.

Following the nationalization of the land in 1979, the Mozambican government introduced the new Land Law (19/97) in 1997³⁶. It reinforced the state's control over land. In its article 3, it specifies that land belongs to the state and cannot be sold. Citizens can acquire title deeds, but cannot buy the land. The law also recognizes customary rights, for those who had occupied the land for at least 10 years. Nevertheless, the reality is a far cry from this policy framework. The end of the war, as a result of the peace agreement signed in Rome in 1992, between Renamo³⁷ and Frelimo, the political transition and the free market economy, meant the coming of a new category of residents (mainly foreigners) in Maputo and Matola, characterized by their strong financial power. This arrival, that is also due to the fact that

36 Galli, 2003

37 National Resistance of Mozambique⁴⁴ 2003

Maputo still concentrates most part of the infrastructures all over the country, intensified land speculation in these two cities. As stated by Araujo⁴⁴ new residents had a financial power, far stronger than middle-class Mozambicans and even less than the poor Mozambicans.

To accommodate the new arrivals, condominiums (enclosed residential areas) had been built and are still being built in Maputo and Matola, often in places already occupied before, by other residents (most of them arrived in the city during the armed conflicts). These buildings meant the eviction of the earlier occupants. Nalsa³⁸ described the case of about 20 families (composed by 5 to 7 members each) evicted to build a road to give rapid access to the condominiums. The families removed from this place were offered a plot at Marracuene (about 35km outside the inner city). Others were displaced from the area where the road to the Golf club was built. Jemusse³⁹ refers to evictions related to the building of Golden Centre⁴⁰.

There is no single criterion relating eviction ; it depends on each particular case. People are normally removed through direct negotiation between the developer and the owners of the places where the condominium has to be built. In many cases, the municipality is not involved, unless for the bureaucratic process once the negotiation is finished. To justify its neutral position the Municipality calls this phenomenon a “natural disappearance⁴¹. Differing from what happened in Zimbabwe, with the Operation Murambatswina, in Angola and in socialist Mozambique, where people were forcedly removed from the cities, in the postsocialist cities the municipality adopt a new discourse, but sticks to the same practices. The municipality stresses the requalification of the urban Maputo and Matola, whereas, it means that people who were living in those places, after the requalification, are forced to leave, because they can no longer afford to meet the requirements to get the title deed, in order to remain.

It explains partially the neutralism of the municipality when the eviction occurs. In spite of their occupation being recognized by the new Land Law, the displaced people have no protection from the government or from the municipality. That’s one of the reasons why most

38 Interview, 02.05.2009

39 Interview, 07.05.2009

40 According to Sónia Jemusse, interviewed on 7th May 2009, Golden Centre is a condominium constructed by the Banco Austral in 1999.

41 Rodrigues, Interviewed on 19th May, 2010

of the displaced doesn't offer much resistance to the eviction. Neither Jemusse⁴² nor Nalsa⁴³ offered much resistance to displacement. As the area is not parcelled out, it is not included in the urbanisation programme and people living there can't access the title deed, even if they have established themselves for more than 10 years. According to the new master plan, approved in 2009, houses can't be built in the plots that are not yet parcelled out. It includes plots that have already been occupied, with the authorization of the city council, mainly during the armed conflict. Therefore, people living in these places are discouraged by the municipality to remain. And when there are new projects for those places, these people have no choice other than accept the symbolic compensation, abandon the plot and find out another place (usually far from the inner city) to establish themselves. As the land belongs to the state, it means that the government can remove people at any time to give way to any project accepted by the municipality.

It is important to remark that the end of the war didn't mean the return of those people who came as refugees, to their places of origin. They remained and they built permanent houses, instead of those by reed and pole. With the expansion of the city, the increasing number of residents, land speculation, these places are being integrated in the new master plan and these people can no longer afford to live there. They end up in places such as Marracuene, Zimpeto, Drive In, Khongolote, far away from the city. It causes many problems for these families, due to the fact that they work in the city or have their children in the schools in the city. Living far away from the city means increasing transport costs (in some cases they have to take two or more buses to commute everyday). These costs are critical when taking in account the fact that these are already poor families.

The relationship between the families affected by displacement and the local authorities is somehow collaborative. The families and local authorities (*secretario dos bairros, chefe dos quarteirões*) usually organize themselves in what they call *Nucleos do bairro*. These are associations that come together to face developers. The objective of these associations is not to resist displacement, because they know that it is an inevitable process. Rather, they organise themselves to protect their concerns when the eviction occurs. However, the political power of these associations is almost insignificant. The local authorities are an institution

42 Interview, 7th May 2009

43 Interviewed on 2nd May 2009

created by the government and work together with the municipality that does not protect the interests of the poor; the municipality is favourable to the building and emergence of condominiums. According to Chambe⁴⁴ condominiums are important because they help to reduce the shortage of housing which represents one of the most important concerns of the Mozambican government. The municipality is also interested in eliminating reed and pole houses around the city. According to Rodrigues⁴⁵, this type of house does not fit in with the housing standards currently allowed in the city (in which case they are considered as an urban problem which must be sorted out). The local authorities and the families do not have enough power to fight the municipality or the developers. Some of the local chiefs, such as Chiao⁴⁶, agree with the eviction process and even suggest good ways of dealing with the victims of evictions. The position of Chiao reinforces the idea of organisational capacity fragility between the residents of *caniços* and the local authorities in resisting evictions. Local authorities will not resist while they are nominated by the government, and the government which is represented by the municipality, is not concerned with *caniço* residents.

3.1. Housing policy, master plan and access to urban land

Whereas in the new housing policy, the government stresses the need for a social housing policy, to allow poor people to live in the cities, paradoxically, this policy establishes criteria to access the equipped land and the house loan, that end up by excluding these poor and those who are in the informal sector, ironically the same category of population evicted from the cities during the OP. For example to access a house loan, apart from an identity card and official employment declaration, one has to meet the debt capacity. It means a minimum salary of at least 10.000 MZN or 276 USD⁴⁷, which is not the reality of the majority of the urban Mozambicans, that earns a minimum salary of less than 100 USD. Demanders also have to present a declaration of employment recognized by the government (private sector, public administration), where the informal sector is excluded. Most people working here can

44 Interviewed, 16.06.2010

45 Interviewed, 19.05.2010

46 Interviewed on 9th January 2010

47 Converted from www.Xe.com on 15th September 2010

meet the debt capacity. Nevertheless they can benefit neither from the loan, nor from the equipped land⁴⁸.

Politically the new master plans of Maputo (2009) and of Matola (2010), were designed based on the principles of the requalification of informal settlements⁵⁶, the development of urban agriculture, which is practiced by the poor, verticality of the town, to accommodate the progressive demand and the speculation over urban land, and the decentralization of the infrastructure, in order to relieve congestion in the “Central Business District⁴⁹”. The practice shows that different directions are being followed. People in informal settlements are progressively abandoning the inner city. The last national census of 2007 showed that Matola city and its suburb registered an increasing number of residents. Most of them quitted Maputo city. This city also registered an increase of its population, but not as Matola, which is unusual. The urban agriculture that is encouraged by the new master plan is practiced by the poor people, by those who have no official job and by the unemployed people. The establishment of these people in town is discouraged by the new housing policy. Theoretical these people can remain in town. But as according to the housing policy, they have no access to the equipped land, neither to the housing fund, they end up quitting the town. The places where they are staying currently (such as Costa Do Sol, Catembe, Polana Caniço, Maxaquene, Urbanização, etc) are those envisaged by the new master plan and by the new housing policy for requalification.

The verticality of the city also contributes to the exclusion of the poor from the city. To accomplish this goal, new buildings have started and other buildings are being planned for in both Matola and Maputo. In Matola the municipality is planning to build an Olympic village. Beyond the fact that some of these buildings are being constructed through the removal of the occupants, they are not accessible to the poor or even middle-class Mozambicans. The cheapest flat in these new buildings can cost 25 000 USD, which is beyond the financial capacity of most Mozambicans. People who can afford these flats are those who can also build houses themselves. It means that the government and the municipality are not solving

48 Following the orientations of the new house policy, the government started identifying plots, installing infrastructures, such as water pipe system, access, electricity. These land are to be provided for those Mozambicans who can meet the requirements established by the new House Policy, mentioned above. ⁵⁶ almost 70% of the people established in Maputo and Matola are on informal settlement, which means they have no title deed

49 Rodrigues, 19th May 2010

the lack of houses, which is one of the goals of the new housing policy. Instead, they are replacing the poor with middle class and rich people in the cities. These poor have no choice other than fixing themselves where there are no urban infrastructures (running water, electricity, conventional roads, etc), in spite of the decentralization program, indicated by the new master plan.

Final remarks

As has been shown here, it's possible to argue that there are continuities and discontinuities on the perceptions of the political leaders and how it influenced on the governance of the urban mobility. As during the colonial time (where the urban area was perceived as white area), where unemployed *indigenous* were denied and discouraged the right to the city, and forcefully driven to *shibalo*, after the independence, the implementation of the Operation Production, in spite of the political discourse of rupture with the colonial heritage, reproduced the same concept, regarding the unemployed people (politically perceived as potential criminals and prostitutes). In fact, as happened in colonial time, people evicted from the cities during the OP were not necessarily unemployed. They couldn't prove their status of producers

(to avoid being evicted), as they did not have a professional card, required by the government. As happened here, the colonial government also demanded the presentation of the professional card for the *indigenous* living in town.

The new housing policy (2010), associated with the new master plans of Maputo and Matola, and mainly the requirements demanded by the new housing policy to access land or loan to build a house also exclude poor people and those who are in the informal sector, as happened during the OP. Poor people or those who earn a minimum salary can't afford to pay back the loan provided in terms of this new policy. Some people in the informal sector can afford to pay the loan, but they do not have a professional card to prove their status as having *de facto* this capacity. To access the fund/the loan to build a house one must present a professional card. And it only happen when employed by the government, the public administration, or the

private sector. There is a need to have a formal employment. It doesn't differ much from what had been defined by the Operation Production and by the colonial government.

These policies (the new housing policy, Operation Production) and the master plans do not discriminate directly against the poor, the unemployed and those who are in the informal sector. Both officially support social housing (for those who have a weaker financial capacity), and communal villages (under the OP these villages were to be inhabited by poor Mozambicans). Their consequences don't much these goals.

Nevertheless there are also discontinuities on the evolution of the perceptions of the political leaders. Different from Operation Production, the new housing policy do not establish the forced eviction of the people from the town. Different from the colonial period, just after the independence and before the eruption of the armed conflict, the occupation of the buildings in the cities, left by the colons, was encouraged by the government. We are in a different political, economic, and socio-cultural context, and it has to be taken in account to analyze the evolution of the political perceptions and the way that public policy are constructed and implemented.

Different from the socialist period, where the government could exercise a strict social control over the population, all over the country and particularly over those living in the capital city, things has changed. The government can no longer oblige the citizens to hold a *guia de marcha*, as a condition to be allowed to move from one residential area to another. Can no longer force citizens to ask for permission to quite the municipal area, has happened also during the colonial era. The government can't either stop the informal market in the urban Maputo and Matola. It partially explains why there is a new political rhetoric such as requalification of the informal settlement.

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